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Styles of Writing and the Afghanistan Model of Warfare 
Submitted for the Spring 2007 Knight Award for Writing Exercises and Handout
Govt 100.3: Power, Tragedy, and Honor: The Three Faces of War 
Instructor: Andrew Yeo
Political scientists read a w ide variety  o f  sources to  keep abreast on dom estic and 
international news. I designed this assignm ent to  fam iliarize students w ith  d ifferent styles o f 
w riting  in political science (or m ore specifically , international relations and foreign policy 
analysis). U ndergraduate students in terested in international politics follow  w orld events 
through different new spapers, m agazines, T V  new s program s, the in ternet, or new s m agazines. 
H ow ever, w hen studying international relations, students are assigned academ ic or policy 
journals w hich  provide m ore substantive content and analysis. Students w ill find that academ ic 
journals, policy journals, and popular m edia w ill all vary in style, prose, and political orientation. 
F o r instance, I assigned tw o articles about air pow er by R obert Pape to  coincide w ith  the w eek  
students participated in the styles o f  w riting  exercise: one w as published in F oreign  A ffa irs, the 
other w as published as an op-ed in the N ew  York Times. The m ain argum ents w ere identical, but 
the style o f  w riting  d iffered substantially. U nlike the  succinct, norm ative driven N ew  York Times 
op-ed piece, Pape provided m ore historical background and technical inform ation in  his Foreign  
A ffa irs  article. Pape also used  m ore “foreign policy ja rg o n ” and provided a m uch m ore nuanced 
treatm ent o f  alternative argum ents and explanations. Interestingly, these articles w ere based on 
P ap e’s academ ic press book, B om bing  to Win: A ir  P ow er a n d  C oercion in War (Cornell 
U niversity  Press 1996). A lthough I did not assign the book, I centered m y class discussion 
around his theories o f  strategic air coercion and used  the book to  also illustrate “academ ic” style 
o f  w riting  com pared to  “policy” w riting  and “op-ed” w riting.
I used  “Styles of Writing and the Afghanistan Model,” as an in-class w riting  exercise.
I designed the assignm ent w ith  four goals in m ind. I w anted  students to  learn  how  to  1) 
distinguish betw een different sources in political science: academ ic journals, policy journals, 
new spapers, and new s m agazines; 2) identify  the  type o f  content each source tended to  provide;
3) recognize the style o f  w riting  in each source and its intended audience; and 4) adopt an 
appropriate style o f  w riting  for their ow n w ork.
I also w anted students to  recognize differences in style and prose since I bu ilt in 
assignm ents th roughout the  course w hich  w ould  require d ifferent styles o f  w riting. F o r instance, 
students w ere expected to  w rite an essay in favor or against the use o f  precision  guided w eapons 
in the  style o f  an op-ed article. A nother essay required  students to  choose a theoretical level o f 
analysis w hen explaining the causes o f  in ternational conflict, and then use the K orean W ar as a 
case study to  test their theory. A n essay tow ards the end o f  the sem ester w as w ritten as a U N  
policy paper recom m ending action on D arfur, Sudan, based on past failures o f  the international 
com m unity  during the 1994 R w andan genocide. Students w ere expected to  adopt an appropriate 
style o f  w riting  for each assignm ent.
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I included this in-class assignm ent during w eek  six w hen w e discussed tactics and 
strategy in war. O n w eek  six, day one (Feb. 27), students read a policy article, m agazine article, 
and op-ed piece on the use o f  air pow er in war. On w eek  six, day tw o (M ar. 1), students read an 
excerpt from  an academ ic book, policy article, and a new spaper article on technology and new  
m ilitary strategy. The readings w ere selected to  give students exposure to  a variety  o f  w riting  
styles. The actual in-class exercise w as then based on one o f  the assigned readings fo r the week: 
B iddle, Stephen. "A fghanistan and the Future o f  W arfare." F oreign  A ffa irs  82, no. 2 (2003).
I chose the in troduction to  this article, and the introduction  (or first few  paragraphs) o f 
three o ther articles w hich w ere all about the “A fghanistan  M odel” o f  com bat (reliance on high- 
tech gadgets and special operations forces). H ow ever, each excerpt w as taken from  a different 
type o f  source. The four articles I used  are provided below :
1) Policy Article (Foreign Affairs)
B iddle, Stephen. "A fghanistan and the F uture o f  W arfare." F oreign  A ffa irs  82 (2), 2003.
2) Academic article (International Security)
A ndres, R ichard  B, C raig W ills, and T hom as E. G riffith. “W inning  w ith  A llies; The Strategic 
V alue o f  the A fghan M odel.” In terna tiona l Security  30 (3), 2005.
3) Popular press (USA Today)
M oniz, Dave. “A fghanistan 's lessons shaping new  m ilitary .” USA Today. O ctober 8, 2002, p.13A.
4) In-depth newspaper analysis/op-ed (The New York Times)
G ordon, M ichael. “G ains and L im its in N ew  L ow -R isk  W ar.” The N ew  York Times. D ecem ber 
29, 2001, Section A; C olum n 3.
Students w ere asked to  w rite  dow n any differences in style they noted in the excerpts. I 
also provided the fo llow ing additional questions for students to  reflect on before discussing the 
excerpts as a group: W hat are som e p lausib le sources o f  these excerpts (i.e. new spaper, academ ic 
journal, popular press)? W hich  in troductions w ere easy or hard to  read? D id  you notice any 
difference in the choice o f  w ords or phrases? W ho do you th ink  w as the intended audience o f  the 
article? I gave the students 10-15 m inutes to  w rite  dow n their answ ers. A s a class, students then 
tried  to  guess possible sources fo r each excerpt. W e then discussed differences in w riting  style 
am ong the four excerpts.
Styles of Writing and the Afghanistan Model of Warfare
Assignment: Below are excerpts from four different types o f sources. All four sources were taken from 
the introduction, and discuss the war in Afghanistan after 9/11 which led to a shift in strategy and tactics 
by the U.S. military. After reading each excerpt, write down any differences in style you noted in the 
excerpts below. To help you get started, you might consider the following questions: W hat are some 
plausible sources o f these excerpts (i.e. newspaper, academic journal, popular press)? Which 
introductions were easy/hard to read? Did you notice any difference in the choice o f words or phrases? 
Who do you think was the intended audience of the article? How might the language or style change 
depending on the author’s intended audience?
1) America's novel use o f special operations forces (SOF), precision weapons, and indigenous allies has 
attracted widespread attention since its debut in Afghanistan, proving both influential and controversial. 
Many believe it was responsible for the Taliban's sudden collapse. They see the "Afghan model" as 
warfare's future and think it should become the new template for U.S. defense planning. Others, however, 
see Afghanistan as an anomaly -- a non-repeatable product o f local conditions. Both camps are wrong. 
The Afghan campaign does indeed offer important clues to the future o f warfare, but not the ones most 
people think -- because the war itself was not fought the way most people think. Both sides in the debate 
assume that the Afghan campaign was waged at standoff ranges, with precision weapons annihilating 
enemies at a distance, before they could close with U.S. commandos or indigenous allies. For proponents 
o f the Afghan model, this is what gives the model its broad utility: with SOF-guided bombs doing the real 
killing at a distance, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. For Afghan model detractors, 
conversely, it is the apparent ability to annihilate from afar that makes the campaign seem so anomalous 
and a product o f idiosyncratic local factors.
2) The military campaign in Afghanistan was a striking success for a new style o f warfare, in which 
American commandos took center stage and played a vital role in organizing the Afghan resistance and 
directing punishing airstrikes. The novel strategy enabled the United States to topple the Taliban, install a 
friendly government and ensure that Al Qaeda could no longer use Afghanistan as a base for terrorism. 
Those ends were achieved with a small number o f American ground troops, with little political backlash 
in the Muslim world about an "occupying" Western army and with a very limited loss o f American lives. 
Having brought important gains at modest cost, this is an approach the Pentagon may be tempted to repeat 
as it plans military campaigns against Iraq or terrorist organizations around the world. But the American 
strategy also had a decided drawback: the decision to let proxy forces bear the brunt o f the ground 
fighting may have allowed many Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and possibly Osama bin Laden himself, 
to escape.
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3) In this article, we argue that the pessimism that has characterized analysis o f the Afghan model is 
misplaced. Airpower, special forces, and indigenous troops (even those with relatively little training) form 
a powerful and robust combination. While events in Afghanistan and later in northern Iraq demonstrated 
the costs and the benefits o f using the model, when these are compared with the costs and benefits o f 
deploying heavy divisions, and particularly the costs o f creating new governments without indigenous 
war allies, the model performs well. Moreover, because this new way o f war lowers the costs to the 
United States, in both blood and treasure, it creates a more credible stick to use in coercive diplomacy 
against small- and medium-sized opponents than do threats o f conventional invasion. The lesson of 
Afghanistan and Iraq is that, when used correctly, the Afghan model offers the United States strategic 
advantage and leverage abroad. Below we analyze how this new way o f war performed in Afghanistan 
and later in Iraq. The study explores how the techniques came about in the face of a largely skeptical 
military establishment, why they worked, and some o f their strengths and weaknesses. We conclude with 
a discussion o f the strategic implications o f the model for future U.S. military diplomacy.
4) W ithout a single battle tank or armored troop carrier, the United States and a ragtag rebel army routed 
Afghanistan's Taliban to claim the first major battle o f the 21st century. The Pentagon's most important 
weapons: elite commandos riding into battle on horseback and thousands of satellite-guided smart bombs. 
But any elation over America's sudden victory in Afghanistan was tempered by spotty intelligence, 
civilian casualties, training that isn't tailored to fighting terrorists and the vexing uncertainty over whether 
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is alive or dead. Those successes and failures have prompted the 
military to re-examine many fundamental practices, from how it recruits special operations troops to how 
it trains to fight agile, shadowy foes. Some o f the changes were under way before Sept. 11, 2001. But it's 
clear that the war on terrorism will lead to robust funding for defense, radically new weapons, 
unconventional battlefield tactics and closer ties between the uniformed military and U.S. intelligence 
agencies.
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